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I. INTRODUCTION
Since September 11, 2001, criticizing firefighters, the police, or the
military seems downright unpatriotic, if not treasonous. The purpose
of this Article is not to undermine the effectiveness of the U.S. mili-
tary, but to point out a weakness by suggesting that increased aware-
ness of a problem and proposed solutions is one of the first steps
toward resolution. The American response to the terrorists' attacks
and the media's coverage of them have heightened awareness in the
United States regarding the Taliban's treatment of women in Afghani-
stan and how unfair that treatment was. It is time for more Ameri-
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cans to become aware of unfair treatment of women within the U.S.
military, particularly regarding sexual harassment, so that some of
the solutions that experts have proposed can have a chance at imple-
mentation and a chance at success, which could only strengthen the
effectiveness of the military.
Because what at least one military law expert has called the "war-
rior mystique,"1 an unspoken, unwritten, unofficial aspect of military
culture, keeps the U.S. military from preventing, effectively litigating,
and adequately compensating for sexual harassment, Congress should
move the response to sexual harassment claims out of the military and
into the federal administrative and judicial systems. According to
that expert, who was a warrior in Vietnam and later a military lawyer
and judge, the warrior mystique pervades military culture and in-
cludes, among others, the following elements: fierce competitiveness
for promotions and assignments; a "good old boys" network; the notion
that women do not belong in combat; an inability or unwillingness on
the part of men in the military to see women in the military as equals;
the idea that, because the military teaches young men to be violent to
protect their country, the country should look the other way whenever
those young men are violent even against women, because, after all,
boys will be boys, and they are doing only what they have been taught
and are expected to do; the mere WAC rule, which has manifested it-
self for decades as the ideas that women who join the military are
certainly not ladies, are not even women worthy of respect, are most
likely lesbians or whores, and are therefore fair game for, and may
indeed be asking for, whatever happens to them, including sexual dis-
crimination, sexual stereotyping, and sexual harassment; and the idea
that female soldiers are not real soldiers. 2
Another commentator discusses a similar theory in what she calls
the "warrior culture" in the male-dominated military, which demands
women's marginalization, because accepting women as peers would be
antithetical to the macho identity encouraged by the military.3
Many-if not most-professional soldiers, however, maintain that the
warrior culture is necessary to develop combat soldiers. As one
1. Interviews with Jonathan P. Tomes, Partner, Tomes & Dvorak, Overland Park,
Kansas (Aug. 6, 1995, July 24, 1999, & Oct. 5, 2001) [hereinafter Tomes Inter-
views]. The term warrior mystique, its definition, and its elements are used in
this article with permission of Jonathan P. Tomes. Mr. Tomes is a retired lieu-
tenant colonel in the Army Judge Advocate General's Corps and author of the
SERVICEMEMBER'S LEGAL GUIDE (4th ed. 2002) and numerous law review articles
on military law. As an Army officer, he was an infantry platoon leader with the
First Cavalry Division in Vietnam in 1969, a military prosecutor, a military de-
fense counsel, a military judge, and the chief military law instructor at the U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
2. Tomes Interviews, supra note 1.
3. See LINDA BiRD FRANCKE, GROUND ZERO: THE GENDER WARS IN THE MILITARY 152,
157 (1997).
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Marine infantryman stated, for example, "You can call [the warrior
culture] BS but until someone comes up with a better way to get terri-
fied 18-year-olds to stand up in front of machine guns... I'm sticking
with it."4
Unfortunately, it is hard to argue with that logic, especially at a
time when we need combat troops in our all-volunteer armed forces
who are willing to go stand up in front of machine guns in Afghani-
stan, Iraq, and elsewhere to protect us from terrorism. It is also hard
to imagine, however, the damage that sexual harassment does to the
women in the military who also want to protect and defend us. Sexual
harassment damages not only those women but also the effectiveness
of the military. Even the warrior mystique cannot justify that kind of
damage-for the military could be so much more effective if it could
avoid the equivalent of eating its young in the way that it responds to
sexual harassment.
This Article will discuss how the warrior mystique causes sexual
harassment to persist in the military so that the military cannot pre-
vent, effectively litigate, or adequately compensate for sexual harass-
ment and how proposals for Congress to make Title VII protections
available to military victims of sexual harassment could help balance
some of the damaging effects of the warrior mystique.
II. THE MILITARY CANNOT PREVENT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Just as sexual discrimination and sexual harassment continue in
corporate America despite decades of lawsuits, federal and state legis-
lation and regulation, and corporate efforts to combat sexual harass-
ment in the workplace, 5 female servicemembers are still subject to
pervasive sexual harassment in the military. Despite increased train-
ing in the prevention of sexual harassment,6 "zero tolerance" policies,7
4. Thomas E. Ricks, Army Faces Recruiting Obstacle: A Less-Macho Image, WALL
ST. J., Jul. 15, 1997, at A.20 (quoting John Lundy).
5. David M. Benck & Tessa Thrasher Hughes, Investigating a Sexual Harassment
Complaint: Prompt Remedial Action, ACCA DOCKET, Mar. 2002, at 72; Andrew R.
Gold & Katharine H. Parker, Workplace Sexual Harassment Policies: Exercising
Reasonable Care in Prevention, ACCA DOCKET, Mar. 2002, at 58.
6. See Hearing on the Statement and Status Report of the Congressional Commis-
sion on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues as Required by the National
Defense Authoritarian Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Pub. L. No. 105-85) Before the
Subcomm. on Military Personnel of the House Armed Services Comm., 106th
Cong. (1999) (noting, for example, that the Army now includes prevention of sex-
ual harassment as a part of basic combat training and equal opportunity and
sexual harassment training as part of the Pre-Command Course, the Cadre
Training Course, and other courses), available at http://www.house.gov/hasc/tes-
timony/106thcongress/99-03-17commissionl.htm.
7. An article in the Naval Law Review defined a "zero tolerance" sexual harassment
policy as one that 'means that every individual complaint of sexual harassment
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and highly publicized courts-martial of those accused of sexual harass-
ment,8 sexual harassment continues to be a problem for the U.S. mili-
tary. For example, naval investigators reported 156 cases of
inappropriate relationships between January 1986 and May 1988 at
Great Lakes Naval Base near Chicago, where the Navy conducts its
basic training.9 Among these cases were fourteen cases of sexual har-
assment of recruits by instructors.10 Not only do investigations and
disciplinary actions" indicate that sexual harassment continues in
will be investigated and that the individuals involved in the 'unwanted' sexual
attention will be brought to justice." Kristin K. Heimark, Sexual Harassment in
the United States Navy: A New Pair of Glasses, 44 NAVAL L. REV. 223, n.9 (1997).
The Navy announced its "zero tolerance" policy in 1989 when Navy Secretary
Lawrence Garret issued the following instruction: "Sexual harassment is unac-
ceptable conduct; it undermines the integrity of the employment relationship,
debilitates morale, and interferes with the work productivity of an organization.
Sexual harassment will not be tolerated at any level. Substantiated acts of or
conduct which results in sexual harassment shall result in corrective action."
NAVY SEC'Y LAWRENCE GARRET, DEP'T OF THE NAVY, SECNAV INSTRUCTION No.
5300.26A (1989).
Criticism of the "zero tolerance" policy focus*es on the belief that the military
professes zero tolerance easily but fails to enforce it:
The military professes to have "zero tolerance" of sexual harassment,
with elaborate policies to define and prevent offenses. Unfortunately,
the phrase "zero tolerance" has become a parody of itself, more accu-
rately referring to things the military doesn't really care to do anything
about. Instead of taking action to enforce a policy and eliminate problem
behavior, which the military is historically quite effective in doing, it is
much easier to just proclaim there is "zero tolerance" and move on to
something else.
Diane H. Mazur, The Beginning of the End for Women in the Military, 48 U. FLA.
L. REV. 461, 464 (1996).
8. Perhaps the most notorious trial was that of the Army Sergeant Major Gene Mc-
Kinney for sexual harassment, allegedly consisting of pressuring subordinates for
dates, forced kissing, and boasting of his sexual prowess to female subordinates.
Sergeant Major McKinney was acquitted by general court-martial of all sexual
harassment charges and convicted of one specification of obstruction of justice for
attempting to coach the testimony of one of his accusers. See, e.g., Jane Gross,
Former Top Sergeant of Army Is Acquitted of All Sex Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
14, 1998, at Al [hereinafter Gross, Former]; Jane Gross, When Character Counts,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1998, at Al; Stephen Komarow, Army Sex Scandal Reaches
Higher, Service's Top Enlisted Man Faces Charges, USA TODAY, May 8, 1997, at
3A. Certainly, some irony exists in being convicted of trying to cover up crimes of
which one was found not guilty.
9. Navy Report: Sexual Harassment Not Pervasive at Coed Boot Camp, THE ST.
J.-REG., Dec. 26, 1988 (Local), at 12, as cited in Michael I. Spak & Jonathan P.
Tomes, Sexual Harassment in the Military: Time for a Change of Forum?, 47
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 335, 368 n.8 (1999). If 156 cases is not pervasive, what is?
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Amanda Vogt, Ex-Navy Instructor Admits to Sex Charges, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 7, 1998, at 1 (reporting a Navy petty officer's sentence to a demotion, a bad-
conduct discharge, and 198 days' confinement for pleading guilty to sexual har-
assment and fraternization with recruits); Sailor in Sex Case Still Unhappy, AP
ONLINE, Nov. 3, 1998, at 1998 WL 21782521 (This article reported on a sexual
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the military, but scholarly writings, and mainstream newspaper arti-
cles recognize the problem, as well.12
Sexual harassment and the methods currently used to remedy it
continue to cause problems for commanders and those whom they
lead. Further, the "solutions" may actually exacerbate the problems
that women face in the military. Professor Diane H. Mazur, a former
Air Force officer, in an article that demonstrates considerable insight
into the military, has noted that potential solutions, although ad-
vanced by those who support greater military participation by women,
"are more dangerous because they are superficially protective and
supportive, yet unwittingly they will erode the already uncertain sta-
tus of military women even further."13 She believes that the solutions
are based on an incorrect assumption that women are incapable of re-
sisting inappropriate sexual behavior or, in many cases, of reporting
it:
The military has already taken a number of steps to prevent future instances
of sexual misconduct against women recruits and, at least so far, the mili-
tary's actions have been applauded. In particular, the Army has increased
supervision of recruits, has moved to severely punish past offenders, and is
devising new systems for reporting misconduct. Unfortunately, these actions
have been myopically short-term in nature. Each carries a long-term danger
for women in the military, and in the hurry "to do something," little attention
has been paid to whether they are doing more harm than good.
1 4
Professor Mazur cites training regulations prohibiting trainees
from going anywhere alone as an example of a "fix" that is counter-
harassment victim's dissatisfaction with nonjudicial punishment taken against
the commander of a Navy destroyer who had made suggestive comments and
kissed her. The maximum punishment that he could receive-the actual punish-
ment was not reported-was thirty days of restriction and a punitive letter of
reprimand.).
12. See, e.g., SEC'Y OF DEFENSE WILLIAM S. COHEN, DEP'T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL RE-
PORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS app. G, tbl.G-2 (1998) (detailing the
high number of sexual harassment complaints filed with the Department of De-
fense between 1987 and 1996); MARGARET C. HARRELL & LAURA L. MILLER, NEW
OPPORTUNITIES FOR MILITARY WOMEN: EFFECTS UPON READINESS, COHESION, AND
MORALE 73-77 (1997); Tom Bowman, Army Officers Fear Dating Ban May Hurt
Bonds Within Units: Cohen Expected to OK Policy Soon; He Wants Same Code
Among All Branches, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 3, 1999, at 9A (stating that a
ban on socializing between junior officers and their sergeants would harm cama-
raderie and unit cohesion).
Also, a very well thought out article postulates that "more so than in other
areas of the law, the legal regulation of sexual conduct has been characterized by
inattention and panic, minimization and overreaction." Martha Chamallas, The
New Gender Panic: Reflections on Sex Scandals and the Military, 83 MINN. L.
REV. 305, 306 (1998) (illustrating the military's inattention/panic contradiction
leading to the conclusion that curing the problem of sexual harassment by the
resegregation of women in basic training stems from faulty logic that confuses
sexual harassment with heterosexuality and mistakes power for sexual desire).
13. Mazur, supra note 7, at 462.
14. Id. at 465.
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productive. She believes that a policy suggesting that women must be
protected from harm by restricting their liberty is similar to the ratio-
nale behind prohibiting women in combat-no one on the battlefield
can protect women from attacks by their fellow soldiers.15 Further
according to Professor Mazur, prosecutions often only discipline the
men, where both men and women have engaged in inappropriate, but
consensual relationships. The problem with this type of prosecution is
that exempting women from responsibility diminishes their service
and sets a poor precedent for the future.16 But the situation may not
be likely to change. For example, the Defense Advisory Committee on
Women in the Services ("DACOWITS") has reported that male super-
visors feared that their superiors would not support them if they tried
to hold women accountable, and subordinate females feared that this
situation harmed their opportunity to be treated as equals.i7 Finally,
new systems for reporting misconduct are unlikely to be productive,
because they do not use the chain of command. Using the chain of
command is ingrained in all servicemembers, but once one goes
outside it to report a problem, that problem is no longer a priority for
the command:
Policies that encourage women to take their complaints outside the chain of
command are the worst possible way to approach the problem of sexual mis-
conduct. If we tell the military that it is incapable of preventing sexual mis-
conduct, it will never become capable. If we tell individual supervisors and
commanders that they are incompetent to respond to women's concerns, they
will remain incompetent.1 8
In short, the warrior mystique flourishes, and sexual harassment
continues to be a major problem for the military. Further, the existing
system for dealing with sexual harassment does not appear to be ade-
quately preventing the problem. Rather, both the existing system and
recent "fixes" appear to be exacerbating the problem, harming both
the military and those whom the system is designed to protect from
sexual harassment. Scholars have proposed a number of solutions, in-
cluding: renaming and reorienting the offense of fraternization be-
cause, in its current "sexualized meaning," the rules are incoherent
and place too much emphasis on the dangers of sexual conduct as op-
posed to overly familiar behavior and reduce or eliminate broad bans
on consensual conduct outside the chain of command;19 extending Ti-
15. Id. at 466.
16. Id. at 467-69. The author does not suggest that men should not be punished as
severely as has occurred or that women should be punished as severely, but that
the punishment should be related to the degree of culpability that would nor-
mally result in a higher ranking male being punished more severely than a lower
ranking female.
17. Rowan Scarborough, Pentagon Finds Less Harassment; Officers Cite "Fear" of
Women, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1998, at Al.
18. Mazur, supra note 7, at 470.
19. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 12, at 361-63.
[Vol. 83:79
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tle VII to uniformed personnel;20 and changing the forum for the adju-
dication of harassment cases from the court-martial to the Equal
Employmet Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and federal civil
court.2 1 Despite these suggestions, the military continues to experi-
ence problems preventing sexual harassment, as well as effectively lit-
igating it and adequately compensating it, because of the warrior
mystique.
III. THE MILITARY CANNOT EFFECTIVELY LITIGATE
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
The military justice system, including courts-martial, was not de-
signed to determine whether a female servicemember was the victim
of sexual harassment by another servicemember. 22 Further, the
factfinders in this system are not particularly suited to making this
type of determination, whether the factfinder is a commander who is
deciding whether the allegation is substantiated so as to require disci-
plinary action against the offender, whether the factfinder is a conven-
ing authority deciding whether to try a case by court-martial, or
whether the factfinder is a court-martial panel trying to determine
beyond a reasonable doubt whether to convict an accused harasser.
Evaluation of a sexual harassment case is far more complicated
than deciding, for example, whether a servicemember should be pun-
ished for absence without leave.23 Professor Chamallas, in her article
on the military's "gender panic," opines that this panic lumps both co-
ercive and consensual sexual conduct into the same undifferentiated
source-biological urges-which results in commanders treating rap-
ists as if they have caused the same types of injuries to persons as
those who have committed adultery.24 Further, because most com-
manders are male and the senior ones are usually older males, they
may have difficulty divorcing themselves from a culture that has his-
20. Yxta Maya Murray, Sexual Harassment in the Military, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. & Wo-
MEN'S STUD. 279, 290-91 (1994).
21. Michael I. Spak & Jonathan P. Tomes, Sexual Harassment in the Military: Time
for a Change of Forum?, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 335 (1999).
22. Aside from the lack of women in the military at the time that our military justice
system was created, little doubt exists that it was viewed as an instrument of
discipline, not a -system of justice. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265
(1969) ("A court-martial is not yet an independent instrument of justice but re-
mains to a significant degree a specialized part of the overall mechanism by
which military discipline is preserved."); JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR., JUSTICE UNDER
FIRE: A STUDY OF MILITARY LAW 21-24 (1974).
23. The Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"), 10 U.S.C. § 886 (2000), criminal-
izes leaving one's military unit without authority.
24. Chamallas, supra note 12, at 320.
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torically viewed sexual harassment as unimportant. 25 In other words,
the warrior mystique makes it hard to police sexual harassment cases.
Political correctness pressures, media pressures, and the like may
lead to bad decisions. Such pressures can cause the commander either
to prosecute a servicemember that he or she shouldn't or, strangely
enough, to prevent prosecutions that should occur. Professor Chamal-
las has noted the phenomenon that the excessive media coverage of
the numerous military sex cases creates the impression that things
have gone too far and that it is time to stop the accusations. 26 In addi-
tion, media saturation has generated a high degree of skepticism
about the legitimacy of complaints of sexual harassment.27 Finally,
commanders, out of fear of the post-Tailhook bloodletting (which de-
stroyed careers or delayed promotions), may tend to err "on the side of
inquisition, persecution, and recrimination."28
Further, commanders have a strong incentive not to find a sexual
harassment claim to be valid. Finding that one of his or her subordi-
nates sexually harassed another may well indicate to the com-
mander's superiors that he or she does not have an effective program
to combat sexual harassment and, worse, that he or she has no control
over the servicemembers under his or her command. Further, if the
press gets involved, it makes not only the immediate unit, but also
higher units and the military service itself, look bad. Such problems
are hardly career-enhancing, and the warrior mystique prevents
proper evaluation of a potential sexual harassment case:
At each level of the chain, the superior officer has discretion concerning how to
deal with the complaint. Additionally, each superior has a vested interest in
what is termed in naval aviation parlance "covering your six." Each individ-
ual is held responsible for the personnel below them. Covering your six can
lead to many complaints being hidden or ignored. Investigations into a com-
plaint attract attention to the problem, and a problem looks bad for the supe-
rior responsible. 2 9
25. Douglas R. Kay, Comment, Running a Gauntlet of Sexual Abuse: Sexual Harass-
ment of Female Naval Personnel in the United States Navy, 29 CAL. W. L. REV.
307, 330 (1992) (citing Kay Krohne, The Effect of Sexual Harassment on Female
Naval Officers: A Phenomenological Study (1991) (unpublished Ed.D. disserta-
tion, University of San Diego)). For a discussion of the effects of the military's
culture on sexual harassment and other sex crimes, see FRANcKE, supra note 3, at
152, 190; Kenneth Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the
Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 525 (1991); Murray, supra note 20, at
296-97.
26. Chamallas, supra note 12, at 320.
27. Id. at 321.
28. Bruce T. Smith, Tempting the Better Part of Valor, 44-FEB FED LAW. 13, 13
(1977).
29. Kay, supra note 25, at 331 (citing DOROTHY SCHNEIDER & CARL SCHNEIDER,
SOUND OFF? AMERICAN MILITARY WOMEN SPEAK OUT 47 (1988) ("Usually the
physical assaults servicewomen told us about were reported but handled semioffi-
cially, at as low as level as possible, by people who wished to quiet the troubled
waters or swim out of them.")).
[Vol. 83:79
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Assuming that the commander makes a proper decision to send a
sexual harassment case to a court-martial, 30 the issue remains
whether a court-martial is a proper forum for a sexual harassment
case. Among the many problems with the court-martial system in
general are the following: courts-martial are not sitting courts, but
rather are "convened" by commanders; commanders select the court-
members (jurors); commanders decide, subject to review by the mili-
tary judge, many pretrial motions, such as discovery motions and mo-
tions to produce witnesses; commanders enter into plea bargains with
defendants or immunize witnesses to induce them to testify, and so-
called "command influence" can taint the trial. These problems may
make arriving at a proper decision unlikely in a court-martial. In ad-
dition, other aspects of the military justice system, which may not lead
to unfair decisions in any other case, may prevent reaching a proper
decision in a sexual harassment case. These aspects include the re-
quirement to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the
nonunanimous jury verdict requirement in a court-martial.
Courts-martial are not sitting courts, but rather are ad hoc tribu-
nals to which commanders may refer one or more cases for trial.31
The same problems with commanders investigating and disposing of
sexual harassment complaints 3 2 apply to convening authorities' deci-
sions whether to send a sexual harassment case to trial by court-mar-
tial. First, as one military court-martial illustrated, the convening
authority may not be the one who should make decisions as to
whether a sexual harassment claim goes to trial. In United States v.
Kroop,3 3 the convening authority in a sexual harassment case was be-
ing investigated for sexual crimes of a similar nature to those of the
accused. The military appellate court did not find these facts to dis-
qualify the convening authority.3 4 Would a civilian criminal justice
30. R. COURTS-MARTIAL 306(b) ("Allegations of offenses should be disposed of in a
timely manner and the lowest appropriate level of disposition listed in subsection
(c) of this rule.") See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the dispositions authorized by Rule of Courts-Martial 306(c).
The disposition decision is one of the most important and difficult decisions
facing a commander. Many factors must be taken into consideration and bal-
anced, including, to the extent practicable, the nature of the offenses, any miti-
gating or extenuating circumstances, the character and military service of the
accused, any recommendations made by subordinate commanders, the interests
of justice, military exigencies, and the effect of the decision on the accused and
the command. The goal should be a disposition that is warranted, appropriate,
and fair. Factors include possible improper motives of the accuser and reluctance
of the victim or others to testify. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text
for discussion of Rule of Courts-Martial 306(b).
31. BISHOP, supra note 22, at 27 (1974). See also WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW
AND PRECEDENTS 49 (2d ed. 1920).
32. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
33. 34 M.J. 628 (A.F.C.M.R. 1992), affd, 38 M.J. 470 (C.M.A. 1993).
34. Id. at 632.
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system allow a prosecutor under investigation for a crime to make de-
cisions about defendants charged with similar crimes? In addition,
the higher ranking commander who convenes courts-martial and re-
fers cases to them may have difficulty evaluating a sexual harassment
case, may be pressured by the media or others, and may want to cover
up a harassment case to avoid looking as if such problems exist in his
or her command rather than referring the case to trial.35
The Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") does not, in spe-
cific terms, prohibit sexual harassment. Although the Department of
Defense ("DOD") has defined sexual harassment, 36 convening authori-
ties must choose among a number of potential charges, none of which
may cover conduct that constitutes sexual harassment under the DOD
standard. An act of sexual harassment may constitute "cruelty and
maltreatment of a subordinate," 3 7 extortion, 38 indecent language,
39
35. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
36. The Department of Defense definition of sexual harassment, which applies to
both military members and civilian employees, is as follows:
Sexual harassment is a form of sexual discrimination that involves un-
welcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature when: (1) submission to such conduct
is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a person's
job, pay, or career; or (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by a
person is used as a basis for career or employment decisions affecting
that person; or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasona-
bly interfering with an individual's work performance or creates an in-
timidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
SEC'Y OF DEFENSE, PROHIBITION OF SExUAL HARASSMENT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE 1 (Aug. 22, 1994) (Memorandum to Secretaries of the Military Depart-
ments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Inspector General of the Depart-
ment of Defense, Director, Administration and Management, and Directors of the
Defense Agencies).
37. 10 U.S.C. § 893 (2000). This article, Article 93 of the UCMJ, will often apply to
sexual harassment cases, but cases interpreting this article are ambiguous as to
whether it criminalizes maltreatment of direct subordinates only or extends to
any lower ranking personnel. Compare United States v. Hullett, 40 M.J. 189
(C.M.A. 1994) (stating that sexually oriented statements to a junior may violate
Article 93) with United States v. Curry, 28 M.J. 419 (C.M.A. 1989) (remanding
the case because, even though the alleged victim was junior, the appellant had no
authority over her). See also William T. Barto, Sexual Harassment and the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice: A Primer for the Military Justice Practitioner,
ARMY LAw., July 1995, at 3, 4-6 (stating that voluntary acts between the victim
and the accused may exonerate the accused).
38. The UCMJ defines extortion as communicating a threat with the intent to obtain
anything of value. 10 U.S.C. § 927 (2000). Sexual favors qualify as something of
value. United States v. Hicks, 24 M.J. 3, 5-6 (C.M.A. 1987).
39. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000). Indecent language is language that is "grossly offensive
to modesty, decency, or propriety, or shocks moral sensibilities because of its vul-
gar, filthy, or disgusting nature, or its tendencies to incite lustful thought." MAN-
UAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL para. 89c (2002) [hereinafter M.C.M.].
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provoking words and gestures, 40 disorderly conduct,41 and/or fraterni-
zation.42 If the harassment involves physical contact, it may consti-
tute assault, assault consummated by a battery,43 indecent assault,
assault with the intent to commit rape or sodomy,44 rape,45 or sod-
omy,4 6 as well as cruelty and maltreatment and/or fraternization. In
addition, a court-martial could punish an accused under the so-called
"general article" for conduct to the prejudice of good order and disci-
pline or of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces47 or as
40. 10 U.S.C. § 917 (2000). Provoking words or gestures are those that tend to pro-
voke breaches of the peace. M.C.M. para. 42c(1) (2002).
41. 10 U.S.C. § 934. Disorderly conduct is conduct of a nature to affect the peace and
quiet of those who may witness it and be disturbed or provoked to resentment,
including conduct that endangers public morals or outrages public decency.
M.C.M. para. 73c(2) (2002).
42. 10 U.S.C. § 934. Fraternization comprises the act(s) of a commissioned or war-
rant officer fraternizing on terms of military equality with an enlisted person
when such fraternization violated the custom of the accused's service that officers
shall not fraternize with enlisted members on terms of military equality. The
explanation states that factors that the court-martial should consider to deter-
mine whether the contact or association comprises an offense include whether the
conduct has compromised the chain of command, resulted in an appearance of
partiality, or otherwise undermined good order, discipline, authority, or morale.
M.C.M. para. 84c(1) (2002). Fraternization may also be prosecuted as a violation
of Article 92, as violating a general order or regulation if the accused's service has
such a regulation prohibiting fraternization. 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2000).
43. Both of these assaults are prohibited. 10 U.S.C. § 928 (2000).
44. 10 U.S.C. § 934. Indecent assault is one done with the intent to gratify the lust or
sexual desires of the accused. See M.C.M. para. 63 (2002). Assault with the in-
tent to commit rape or sodomy requires a specific intent to commit such crimes.
45. 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2000). The maximum punishment for rape is death, confine-
ment for life, a dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures of all pay and allowances,
and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. M.C.M. para. 46e (2002). Under cur-
rent military law, the military recognizes that the necessary "by force and with-
out consent" may include "constructive force," in which the victim's consent is
induced by the extraordinary power that a military superior has over a
subordinate. E.g., United States v. Clark, 35 M.J. 432 (C.M.A. 1992). See gener-
ally, Timothy W. Murphy, A Matter of Force: The Redefinition of Rape, 39 A.F. L.
REV. 19, 26-34 (1996).
46. 10 U.S.C. § 925 (2000). Sodomy consists of unnatural carnal copulation, defined
as taking into one's mouth or anus the sexual organ of another, placing another's
sexual organ in one's mouth or anus, or to have carnal copulation in any opening
of the body other than the sexual parts. M.C.M. para. 51c (2002).
47. 10 U.S.C. §§ 133-134 (2000) (These sections criminalize conduct unbecoming an
officer and conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline or of a nature to bring
discredit on the armed forces, respectively.). Article 133 criminalizes "action or
behavior in an official capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing the person as
an officer, severely compromises [his or her character], or action or behavior in an
unofficial or private capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing the officer per-
sonally, seriously compromises the person's standing as an officer." M.C.M. para.
59c(2) (2002). Article 134 applies to all ranks and comprises offenses that are
specified in the Manual for Courts-Martial, and acts that are only criminal be-
cause they are prejudicial to good order and discipline or service-discrediting. See
supra notes 44-46; M.C.M. para. 60 (2002).
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conduct unbecoming an officer. 48 Choosing among all of these poten-
tial offenses is not easy and often results in so-called "stacking" of the
charges-charging the accused with all that may apply and letting the
court members sort it out. Selecting the wrong charge or overcharging
can certainly result in an improper verdict. 4 9
Further, although the UCMJ prohibits reprisals-such as lowered
efficiency reports-against court members for making decisions that
the convening authority dislikes, 50 court members know that the com-
mander can harm their careers without taking an action severe
enough to violate the prohibition against reprisals, such as "damning
[the court member] with faint praise on an efficiency report."51 In to-
day's military, you don't get promoted unless you "always exceed re-
quirements" and should be "promoted ahead of contemporaries," as
opposed to "usually exceeding requirements" where you should be
"promoted with contemporaries." Trying to prove that faint, but ca-
reer-killing praise is a reprisal for a court-martial decision is problem-
atic at best. To justify the report of "faint praise," the high-ranking
officer who wrote the report would simply have to say that the effi-
ciency report was accurate because the officer in question always met
requirements and frequently, but not always, exceeded them, and
thus should be promoted along with his or her contemporaries.
5 2
Another problem with the convening authority's control over
courts-martial is that the convening authority decides many pretrial
motions. Defense counsel must submit requests to produce witnesses
to the trial counsel (prosecutor), who works for the convening author-
ity. If the trial counsel does not believe that the law requires their
production, the defense may litigate the matter before the military
judge.53 Requests for expert witnesses, however, must be made di-
rectly to the convening authority. Again, refusal may be litigated
48. 10 U.S.C. § 934.
49. See Kay, supra note 25. The author concludes:
From these cases one can begin to understand how unpredictably sexual
harassment is handled in the military courts. The wide variety of
charges illustrates the inconsistency of sexual harassment enforcement
and punishment. In addition, it is apparent that a body of consistent
case law on sexual harassment has not been developed in the military
court.
Id. at 329.
50. The UMCJ, 10 U.S.C. § 837 (2000), prohibits any convening authority or com-
manding officer from reprimanding any court member, military judge, or counsel
with respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by the court. Nor may they
evaluate the performance of duty of any court member in any fitness or efficiency
report used to determine promotions, assignments, retention on active duty, and
the like.
51. Tomes Interviews, supra note 1.
52. See Michael I. Spak & Jonathan P. Tomes, Courts-Martial: Time to Play Taps? 28
S.w. U. L. REv. 481 (1999).
53. R. COURTS-MARTIAL 703(c)(2).
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before the military judge. 54 Obviously, lack of witnesses harms the
truth-finding process.
Convening authorities also decide whether to grant immunity to
witnesses 55 and whether to enter into plea bargains.56 Because the
military may view the victim of sexual harassment as a suspect, as in
a case in which a regulation bans dating between a trainee and a drill
instructor, a refusal to grant immunity to the victim may result in the
greater offender-the one who has abused his higher rank and posi-
tion-going free. Further, because of the way that convening authori-
ties grant immunity, coupled with an order to testify, significant
potential exists for an alleged victim of fraternization either to lie or to
exaggerate the culpability of the higher ranking servicemember on
trial. Although the order to testify is usually couched in terms of testi-
fying "truthfully," it is the trial counsel who will decide whether the
testimony is truthful. Often, the immunity and order to testify are
coupled with the preferral of court-martial charges against the less
culpable, lower ranking female servicemember and a discharge in lieu
of court-martial if she testifies "truthfully" against the higher ranking
defendant. This system puts an alleged victim who either fabricated a
sexual harassment complaint or exaggerated it in the unenviable posi-
tion of having to testify so as to perpetuate the lie or the exaggeration
to avoid trial herself, again hardly conducive to arriving at the truth.
The warrior mystique in the form of the mere WAC rule (as mentioned
supra, under the mere WAC rule, a female servicemember must be
either a lesbian or a whore but is certainly not a lady) is often appar-
ently in operation in such a situation.
The final problem with command control over courts-martial is the
problem of illegal command influence. Although much command con-
trol is not illegal, such as the power to select court members, 5 7 conven-
54. R. COURTS-MARTIAL 703(d).
55. R. COURTS-MARTIAL 704(c).
56. R. COURTS-MARTIAL 704. The military pretrial agreement, what civilians would
call a "plea bargain," differs from civilian practice in that it places a ceiling on the
punishment. If the court-martial imposes a lesser punishment, the accused gets
the benefit of that lesser punishment and the pretrial agreement was nothing
more than an insurance policy. If, however, the court-martial sentences the ac-
cused to a more severe punishment, the convening authority must reduce the
sentence to that specified in the plea agreement. See generally, Francis A. Gilli-
gan & Michael D. Wims, Civilian Justice v. Military Justice: In Many Instances,
Service Members Accused of Crime Are Granted More Rights Than Civilians, 5
SUM. CRIM. JUST. 2, 37 (1990). For a contrary view comparing military and civil-
ian justice, see Spak & Tomes, supra note 52.
57. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text. The lawful participation of the
commander in the system is one of the dominant features of the military justice
system. Teresa K. Hollingsworth, Unlawful Command Influence, 39 A.F. L. REV.
261 (1996) (citing DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 255 (1992)). When, however, commanders and convening au-
thorities try to influence decisions that should be independent of command and
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ing authorities and other commanders who go too far in controlling
courts-martial may violate Article 37 of the UCMJ, which prohibits
illegal command influence.5 8 Notwithstanding this prohibition, mili-
tary officials have continued to attempt to influence courts-martial re-
sults improperly. Among recent such attempts are the following:
5 9
(1) Issuing policy statements that castigate a certain class of
offenders, state that they should be removed from the mili-
tary, or discourage witnesses from testifying for the
defense.
(2) Making speeches that stress the above points to audiences,
including potential witnesses and court members.
(3) Publicly humiliating the accused, as by stripping them of
unit insignia in a public military formation, thereby strip-
ping the accused of the presumption of innocence and bias-
ing potential court members and witnesses.
(4) Witness tampering, consisting of intimidating witnesses to
prevent them from testifying or punishing those that do.
Although such actions have great potential to prejudice the case,
military appellate courts have developed such a high standard for pre-
vailing on an illegal command influence claim that the accused seldom
gets meaningful, if any, relief.6 0 Further, finding evidence of illegal
convening authority prerogatives, it becomes "illegal" or "unlawful" command in-
fluence as prohibited by the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 837 (2000). Hollingsworth,
supra. Nor is illegal command influence limited to commanders and convening
authorities. Military appellate courts have applied Article 37 to staff officers,
noncommissioned officers, and military judges. Id.
58. The UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 837(a), reads:
(a) No authority convening a ... court-martial, nor any other command-
ing officer, may censure, reprimand, or admonish the court or any mem-
ber, military judge, or counsel thereof, with respect to the findings or
sentence adjudged by the court, or with respect to any other exercises of
its or his functions in the conduct of the proceedings. No person subject
to this chapter may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means,
influence the action of a court-martial . . . or any member thereof, in
reaching the findings or sentence in any case, or the action of any con-
vening, approving, or reviewing authority with respect to his judicial
acts. The foregoing provisions of the subsection shall not apply with re-
spect to (1) general instructional or informational courses in military jus-
tice if such courses are designed solely for the purpose of instructing
members of a command in the substantive or procedural aspects of
courts-martial, or (2) to statements and instructions given in open court
by the military judge, president of a special court-martial, or counsel.
Section (b) of Article 37 prohibits any person subject to the UCMJ from evalu-
ating the performance of any member of a court-martial in the preparation of a
fitness or similar report or from giving a less favorable rating to counsel for the
accused because of the zeal with which counsel represented the accused.
59. Deana M.C. Willis, The Road to Hell Is Paved with Good Intentions: Finding and
Fixing Unlawful Command Influence, ARMY LAw., Aug. 1992, at 3, 6-12.
60. Under the so-called Ayala/Stombaugh test, the defense must first demonstrate
that the alleged source of illegal command influence acted with the mantle of
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command influence is problematic, at best. Those who were illegally
influenced, or witnesses thereto, may be reluctant to risk their careers
by informing on their superiors. Further, military defense counsel
may not want to accuse these commanders or others who may sit on
the lawyer's future promotion boards of illegal command influence. 6 1
Also, alleging illegal command influence is not likely to improve one's
chances for a favorable pretrial agreement (plea bargain) or for clem-
ency if the court-martial imposes a harsh sentence.6 2 Some of the ef-
fects of the warrior mystique appear in these results.
command authority. United States v. Stombaugh, 40 M.J. 208 (C.M.A. 1994).
Ayala places the burden on the defense to produce sufficient evidence to raise the
issue and permits the court to decide that the evidence of the alleged illegal com-
mand influence was not strong enough nor prejudicial enough to grant relief.
United States v. Ayala, 43 M.J. 296 (C.A.A.F. 1995). See Lawrence J. Morris,
This Better Be Good: The Courts Continue to Tighten the Burden in Unlawful
Command Influence Cases, ARMY LAw., May 1998, at 49.
61. Perhaps the most egregious example of a defense counsel being "punished" for
raising illegal command influence resulted in a congressional inquiry. An Army
lawyer who raised an illegal command influence issue for one of his appellate
clients, after his supervising attorney, a full colonel, told him not to, was non-
selected for promotion to lieutenant colonel when his supervisor later sat on the
promotion board. The Army Board for Correction of Military Records found that
the colonel should not have sat on the promotion board and ordered the promo-
tion to lieutenant colonel. As a result of the congressional inquiry, the Acting
Judge Advocate General of the Army was not confirmed as Judge Advocate Gen-
eral and retired. A nomination to the grade of brigadier general also failed, and
the President withdrew two other nominations for brigadier general. One of
these withdrawn nominations for brigadier general was for the colonel who had
"punished" the defense counsel and later sat on the counsel's promotion board.
STAFF OF 102D CONG., SENATE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, REPORT ON THE INVES-
TIGATION OF ISSUES CONCERNING NOMINATIONS FOR GENERAL OFFICER POSITIONS
IN THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S CORPS, U.S. ARMY, S. REP. No. 102-1, 2d Sess.
(1991).
62. Under Rule of Courts-Martial 705, a convening authority may enter into a plea
bargain, known as a "pretrial agreement," with the accused. In cases in which
the court-martial adjudges a more severe sentence than that called for in the
pretrial agreement, the convening authority must then reduce the sentence to
that called for in the agreement. If the court-martial adjudges a less severe sen-
tence, then the accused has "beat the deal" and gets the lesser sentence, relegat-
ing the plea bargain to the status of unused insurance against a more severe
sentence. See generally, Gilligan & Wims, supra note 56, at 37.
In any case, whether a pretrial agreement exists or not, the convening author-
ity may grant clemency by disapproving the entire sentence or any part thereof.
Rule of Courts-Martial 705 1107(d) specifies that the convening authority may for
any or no reason disapprove the sentence in whole or in part, mitigate the sen-
tence, or change a punishment to one of a different nature, as long as doing so
does not increase the severity of the punishment. For example, the convening
authority could change six months' confinement to, say, two months' restriction,
but could not change such a period of restriction to confinement. The granting of
clemency by convening authorities is very rare. More often, they want to, but
cannot, increase the sentence. See R. COURTS-MARTIAL 705.
2004]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Although the requirement to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
is appropriate at courts-martial that can impose criminal sanctions,6 3
this high burden of proof may result in perpetrators of sexual harass-
ment "getting off," and thus failing to vindicate actual victims of such
harassment. For example, although only Sergeant Major of the Army
Gene McKinney and the six women whom he was accused of sexually
harassing6 4 will ever know what, if anything, really happened, com-
mentators have postulated that the heavy burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt65 or the so-called "good soldier" defense led to the
acquittal. Military Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1) is an exception to the
general rule that evidence of a person's character or a trait thereof is
inadmissible to prove that the person acted in conformity with that
character or trait on a particular occasion. Rule 404(a)(1) permits in-
troduction of a "pertinent" character trait.6 6 In the military, general
good military character qualifies as such, as do as other pertinent
character traits.67 The theory is simple: good soldiers do not commit
crimes.68 Because servicemembers receive periodic performance eval-
uations and often commendations and decorations for duty perform-
ance, adducing evidence of good military character is seldom
difficult.69 In the case of a high-ranking officer or noncommissioned
officer, such as Sergeant Major McKinney, such evidence can be over-
whelming. Selection to be the highest ranking enlisted member of
one's service requires one's record to be beyond stellar. This aspect of
the warrior mystique seems to involve closing ranks: if other com-
63. Under Rule of Courts-Martial 920(e), the military judge must instruct the court
members that "[t]he accused must be presumed to be innocent until the accused's
guilt is established by legal and competent evidence beyond reasonable doubt."
R. COURTS-MARTIAL 920(e).
64. Sergeant Major McKinney was accused of pressuring female subordinates for sex,
forced kissing, and boasting of his sexual prowess to the six women and one sex-
ual encounter. See Gross, Former, supra note 8, at Al; Komarow, supra note 8, at
3A. The court-martial did, however, convict him of one obstruction of justice of-
fense for attempting to coach the testimony of one of his accusers. He was de-
moted one grade and reprimanded. Jane Gross, Sergeant Major Gets One-Step
Demotion But No Time in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1998, at Al.
65. Editorial, The McKinney Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1998, at A24.
66. Military Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1) is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence
404(a)(1). See generally, Elizabeth Lutes Hillman, Note, The "Good Soldier" De-
fense: Character Evidence and Military Rank at Courts-Martial, 108 YALE L.J.
879 (1999).
67. For example, an accused's character for truthfulness would be relevant in a pros-
ecution for making a false official statement. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., MILI-
TARY RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 366 (1986).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Vandelinder, 20 M.J. 41 (C.M.A. 1985) (finding that
evidence of good military character should have been admitted at trial for drug
offenses, because one with good military character is less likely to commit of-
fenses that strike at the heart of military discipline and readiness).
69. Captain Andrea, DAD Note, Expanding the Good Soldier Defense: Use of Charac-
ter Evidence as a Defense at Trial, ARMY LAw., Dec. 1993, at 30.
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manders have given the accused good work evaluations, then the ac-
cused must be a good person and therefore innocent of all charges
lodged by "some woman."
Thus, to convict a high-ranking officer or noncommissioned officer
of sexual harassment, the high-ranking court members must believe
the lower ranking complainant, whose credibility cannot be bolstered
by evidence of good military character, 7O against the higher ranking
accused, who can adduce evidence of his good (or overwhelmingly
good) military character.7 1 Unless the lower ranking complainant has
a lot of corroborating evidence, guess which one a court-martial is
likely to believe. 72
Finally, even the U.S. Supreme Court has opined that "courts-mar-
tial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing with the nice sub-
tleties of constitutional law"73 and certainly were not designed to
protect servicemembers from discrimination. 74 Courts-martial are
purely criminal tribunals and are empowered only to determine guilt
or innocence and impose a sentence on a guilty accused. 75 Although
70. Military Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2) permits only evidence of a pertinent trait or
character of the victim of a crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or evidence of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecu-
tion in a homicide or an assault case to rebut evidence that the victim was the
aggressor. The federal counterpart allows such use only in homicide cases. FED.
R. EVID. 404(a)(2). Under Military Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2), the accused can
use the section to attempt to prove that the victim of an assault or homicide has
character traits that tend to prove that the victim may have been responsible for
the crime. Good military character would hardly prove that the victim was re-
sponsible for the crime. Military Rule of Evidence 608(a) allows an attack on the
credibility of a witness or the rehabilitation of the witness, subject to two limita-
tions: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthful-
ness, and (2) such evidence is admissible only after the character of the witness
for truthfulness has been attacked. Again, general good military character would
not qualify.
71. See Hillman, supra note 66, at 906-09.
72. See, e.g., J. Lancaster, In Military Harassment Cases, His Word Outranks Hers,
WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1992, at Al; Editorial, McKinney Case Showcases Military
Law's Shortcomings, USA TODAY, Mar. 16, 1998, at 14A; All Things Considered:
Fort Hood Reactions, (NPR radio broadcast, Mar. 16, 1998) (quoting Army officer
who stated, "the outcome of the Gene McKinney case proves what [a female ser-
vicemember]'s already known... the more a superior has on his collar, the more
he'll get away with."). Although officers and noncommissioned officers do not al-
ways wear their rank on their collars, the meaning is plain.
73. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969) (holding that off-post offenses
must be "service-connected" for the military to exercise jurisdiction over them),
overruled by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
74. Id.
75. Col. William Winthrop's explanation of the criminal nature of courts-martial is as
true today as it was in 1920:
[Tihe court-martial is strictly a criminal court. It has in fact no civil
jurisdiction whatever; cannot enforce a contract, collect a debt, or award
damages in favor of an individual .... Even where it tries and convicts
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the military judge may decide whether military law enforcement au-
thorities coerced a conviction or conducted an illegal search, military
judges and court members have no particular competence in deciding
sexual harassment claims, even if they had jurisdiction to consider
anything other than whether the accused is guilty of some offense
under the UCMJ. Thus, even if a court-martial believes a sexual har-
assment complainant and convicts the accused, the victim's only com-
pensation will be the knowledge that her complaint was vindicated
and that her harasser was punished.
IV. THE MILITARY CANNOT ADEQUATELY COMPENSATE
FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A military victim of sexual harassment may not suffer employ-
ment-related losses, such as lost wages, because military law would
not excuse a harassment victim who went absent without leave
("AWOL") because of the harassment-which would be the military
version of a constructive discharge. 76 In United States v. Roberts,77
the Navy-Marine Court of Military Review overturned the AWOL con-
viction of Seaman Susan Sutek, finding that her fear of an impending
shipboard initiation that had elements of sexual harassment was suf-
ficient to excuse her absence because of duress.78 In United States v.
Biscoe,79 however, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces upheld
the guilty plea of a female officer who contended on appeal that the
military judge had not made sufficient inquiry into her possible de-
an accused for an offense involved in an obligation incurred or injury
done to another person,.., it cannot adjudge that the debt be paid, that
the property be returned, or that its pecuniary value or the amount of
the damage, be made good to the party aggrieved. Its judgment is a
criminal sentence, not a civil verdict: its proper function is to award pun-
ishment upon the ascertainment of guilt.
WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 49-50 (2d ed. 1920).
For a more current view, consider William Westmoreland, Military Justice-A
Commander's Viewpoint, 10 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 5, 8 (1971) ("[lit seems too clear for
argument that courts-martial are criminal courts, possessing penal jurisdiction
exclusively and performing a strictly judicial function in enforcing a penal code
and applying highly punitive sanctions.").
76. A constructive discharge occurs when an employer deliberately makes an em-
ployee's working condition so intolerable that the employee is forced into an in-
voluntary resignation. Spence v. Maryland Cas. Co., 995 F.2d 1147, 1156 (2d Cir.
1993).
77. 14 M.J. 671 (N.M.C.M.R. 1982), rev'd as to Roberts, 15 M.J. 106 (C.M.A. 1983).
As to Seaman Ronald Roberts, the husband of Seaman Sutek, the Navy-Marine
Court of Military Review approved only a sentence of no punishment. The Court
of Military Appeals reversed the lower court's decision as to Seaman Roberts,
reinstating his adjudged punishment.
78. An accused is excused from criminal responsibility under the defense of duress if
she had a reasonably grounded fear of the receipt of serious bodily injury. R.
COURTS-MARTLL 916(h).
79. 47 M.J. 398 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
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fense of duress based on sexual harassment. The court focused on her
lack of fear of serious bodily injury, a fear that the Navy-Marine
Court had found present in Seaman Sutek's case. Thus, it appears
that a servicemember cannot "constructively discharge" herself from
the military because of sexual harassment, unless that harassment
puts her in reasonable fear of serious bodily injury.
Of course, many times the military ends up discharging the victim
of the harassment. She may have violated the same regulations
against fraternization that the accused did, although she would
clearly be less culpable. Or the higher ranking harasser may, upon
suspecting that his improper actions may become known, begin his
defense by discrediting the victim, perhaps by documenting her poor
duty performance and so on. In the military culture, in which arriving
to work five minutes late is a criminal offense,8 0 any supervisor can
easily document "poor" duty performance by counseling statements,
reprimands, and poor efficiency reports, as well as by punitive mea-
sures, such as nonjudicial punishment and courts-martial. Low-rank-
ing victims may find themselves facing charges and receiving a grant
of immunity and an administrative discharge in return for testifying
"truthfully" against the accused.8 1 Because the harassment victims
usually want out of the military by this point, they will accede to this
procedure even when it results in a less-than-fully-honorable dis-
charge and the corresponding loss of military and veteran's benefits.
8 2
Of course, other victims may continue to serve in the military. Any
military sexual harassment victim, however, may suffer damages
other than the ones that sexual harassment law recognizes, such as
intentional infliction of emotional distress, pain and suffering, inva-
sion of privacy, and others.83 Is there any avenue of redress for such
injuries in the military?
As for administrative remedies within the military, only three ex-
ist, and none of them has the power to afford much relief. First, a
victim of sexual harassment may file an Article 138 complaint with
80. Failing to go to, or going from, one's appointed place of duty is a violation of Arti-
cle 86 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 10 U.S.C. § 886 (2000). Absence
without leave is punishable by confinement for one month and forfeiture of two-
thirds pay for one month. M.C.M. para. 10e(1) (2002).
81. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
82. Less than fully "honorable" discharges include "general" discharges, which are
under honorable conditions and entitle the recipient thereof to military and vet-
eran's benefits and "other-than-honorable" discharges, which generally do not re-
sult in the receipt of such benefits. Only a court-martial may adjudge 'punitive"
discharges, bad conduct, and dishonorable discharges that result in the loss of all
benefits. The officer version of a punitive discharge is a "dismissal." JONATHAN
P. TOMES ET AL., SERVICEMEMBER'S LEGAL GUIDE 38-46 (4th ed. 2002).
83. LAWYERS COOPERATIVE PUBLISHING, HANDLING SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES § 28
(1993).
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her commander.8 4 If the commander denies redress, the complaint is
forwarded up the chain of command to the officer exercising general
court-martial jurisdiction. The convening authority conducts an in-
quiry, grants or denies the relief, and sends a report to the service
secretary.8 5
But as discussed supra,8 6 commanders are loath to find sexual har-
assment in their commands, and short of transferring or disciplining
the alleged offender, they have little ability to compensate the victim.
An article in the Southern California Review of Law and Women's
Studies pointed out flaws in using Article 138 to correct sexual harass-
ment problems:
Although Article 138 does give service people an avenue for redress, it is not
adequate for sexual harassment purposes because . . . it requires the service
member to go through the chain of command for relief. Recent events sur-
rounding the Tailhook scandal and the responses of both the female service-
members who were assaulted and their superiors display this weakness in the
Article. When a Navy Lieutenant helicopter pilot filed a complaint with her
boss, he replied, "That's what you get for going to a hotel party with a bunch of
drunk aviators." Another problem with Article 138 is that it applies only to
wrongs committed by a commanding officer upon a subordinate. The provi-
sion will not extend to sexual harassment between fellow enlisted personnel
or to harassment which is visited upon a commander by a subordinate. Fur-
thermore, depending on which service the victim is in, she may not even have
the right to a military attorney. 8 7
Second, a servicemember can obtain review of his or her discharge
from his or her service's discharge review board. Such a board can
change an unfavorable discharge to a more favorable one, but it can-
not revoke the discharge. Further, review boards cannot award dam-
ages for improper discharge or anything else.8 8 Finally, boards of
correction of military or naval records may correct such records to cor-
rect an error or remove an injustice.8 9 Although such a correction
could result in the award of back pay for an improper discharge or
reinstatement, these boards cannot award other damages.90 Further,
to get relief, one must have an incorrect record to correct. In Saal v.
84. 10 U.S.C. § 938 (2000) (Article 138 of the UCMJ).
85. Id.
86. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
87. Murray, supra note 20, at 290-91.
88. 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (2000). See David S. Franke, Administrative Separation from
the Military: A Due Process Analysis, ARMY LAw., Oct. 1990, at 11, 19.
89. 10 U.S.C.A. § 1552 (West Supp. 2003).
90. See Von Hoffburg v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 633, 640-41 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding
that inadequacy of a remedy available from the Army Board for Correction of
Military Records, which lacks authority to award damages, is outweighed by con-
siderations of efficiency and agency expertise underlying the exhaustion require-
ment and by the availability of other remedies, such as reinstatement and
payment of backpay).
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Middendorf,91 the court noted that, by issuing an honorable dis-
charge, the Navy "effectively precluded review . . . by the Board for
Correction of Naval Records for there [was] no record left to correct."9 2
The board does not conduct an independent investigation,9 3 nor does
the board's authority extend to striking down military policy. More-
over, the board probably lacks the competence to decide constitutional
issues. 94 As one commentator noted:
[The Board of Corrections] is an inadequate means to redress sexual harass-
ment complaints because it offers no aid unless a victim has a negative com-
ment on her record as a function of, or in retaliation for, complaining about
sexual harassment. Sexual harassment is rarely manifested by recorded ad-
monishments. Moreover, "injustice" is not defined, service-members have no
right to a hearing, and complainants rarely know when they have exhausted
intramilitary remedies and earned the right to appeal to a civilian court. Fur-
thermore, civilian courts usually defer to the BCMR's decisions.
9 5
If, as it appears, the military interservice remedies cannot afford
relief to a victim of sexual harassment, what about the federal courts?
At present, sexual harassment victims have no greater chance for re-
dress in the federal courts than in the military system because of the
so-called Feres doctrine and because Title VII does not apply to the
military.
Fifty years ago, in Feres v. United States,9 6 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that servicemembers could not sue the military for mone-
tary damages. Feres involved lawsuits brought under the Federal
Tort Claims Act ("FTCA")97 by three active duty servicemembers who
were victims of negligence by military personnel acting within the
91. 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Beller v.
Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981).
92. Id. at 197.
93. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 723.3(e) (2003).
94. See Walmer v. United States Dep't of Defense, 835 F. Supp. 1307, 1310-11 (D.
Kan. 1993), affd, 52 F.3d 851 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 974 (1995)
(finding that a servicemember pending discharge for homosexual conduct was not
required to appeal her discharge to the Army Board for Correction of Military
Records ("ABCMR") before asserting the unconstitutionality of the regulations
under which she was discharged in federal court, because the ABCMR has no
power to strike down military policy and constitutional issues are inappropriate
for decision by an administrative body).
95. Murray, supra note 20, at 286-87.
96. 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
97. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2000). The FTCA waived sovereign immunity for cer-
tain torts committed by employees of the United States. The relevant portion
reads:
[F]or injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred.
Id. § 1346(b).
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scope of their employment. The Court focused on three rationales for
its decision. First, the FTCA did not create an action for ser-
vicemembers against their military superiors or the government itself,
because the FTCA created no new causes of action and because no
American cause of action ever allowed a servicemember to recover
damages from his or her military superiors.9g Second, because the
FTCA bases liability on the law of the state where the act or omission
occurred and because servicemembers have no control over their as-
signments, it would be nonsensical to base liability on the law of the
forum state. 99 Finally, because servicemembers have a generous stat-
utory scheme of military and veteran's benefits, Congress must not
have intended to give them an additional remedy under the FTCA.100
Thus, servicemembers cannot maintain a suit if the injury is "incident
to service."10 1
Notwithstanding almost universal scholarly criticism of the deci-
sion,102 the U.S. Supreme Court has continued to affirm Feres. For
example, in Chappell v. Wallace, 1 0 3 the Court extended Feres to con-
stitutional torts committed by the military, holding that ser-
vicemembers could not recover monetary damages for such wrongs.1 0 4
Unites States v. Stanley105 affirmed Chappell, noting that the courts
should not allow lawsuits that would call into question military
decisionmaking:
Even putting aside the risk of erroneous judicial conclusions (which would be-
cloud military decision making), the mere process of arriving at correct conclu-
98. Feres, 340 U.S. at 141-42.
99. Id. at 143.
100. Id. at 140.
101. Id. at 146.
102. See, e.g., Barry Bennett, The Feres Doctrine, Discipline, and the Weapons of War,
29 ST. Louis U. L.J. 383 (1984); Captian Robert L. Rhodes, U.S.A.F., The Feres
Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F. L. REV. 24 (1976); David E. Seidelson,
The Feres Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: New Insight into an Old
Problem, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 629 (1983); Jonathan P. Tomes, Feres to Chappell
to Stanley: Three Strikes and Servicemembers Are Out, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 93
(1990); Donald Zillman, Intramilitary Tort Law: Incidence to Service Meets Con-
stitutional Tort, 60 N.C. L. REV. 489 (1982).
103. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
104. Id. at 305. Chappell involved claims of racial discrimination. Although the U.S.
Supreme Court's earlier decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed-
eral Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), authorized suits for damages
against federal officials who had violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, the
Chappell Court held that the Bivens limitation on such remedies when "special
factors counseling hesitation," 403 U.S. at 396, are present applied to suits by
military members against their superiors, thereby foreclosing relief. Chappell,
462 U.S. at 304. The Chappell Court focused on the unique disciplinary structure
of the military and Congress' activity in the field. Id. The Court did note that
injunctive relief or other forms of relief not involving damage awards remained
available. Id.
105. 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
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sions would disrupt the military regime. The "incident to service" test, by
contrast, provides a line that is relatively clear and that can be discerned with
less extensive inquiry into military matters. 106
Obviously, many sexual harassment cases could involve extensive
inquiry into military matters. The disruption to the "military regime"
caused by allowing such lawsuits, however, would hardly seem greater
than the disruption caused by the Navy's investigation into Tailhook,
the Sergeant Major McKinney case, discussed supra, or the Aberdeen
Proving Ground trainee sexual harassment cases.' 0 7
Further, there is not any real evidence that barring ser-
vicemembers from suing harms discipline. Feres and its progeny have
106. Id. at 683.
107. At the 1991 Tailhook convention, junior Navy officers assaulted approximately
eighty-three women. As to the effect of the investigation, one commentator
noted:
After allegations surfaced of junior Naval officers' assaults on women at
the Tailhook convention, the Navy's attempts to police itself revealed a
disturbing pattern of outright sexism and corruption. The executive
branch during the Bush Administration was also angered by the Inspec-
tor General's inability to investigate the allegations successfully. The
Inspector General and the Naval Investigative Service Command began
preliminary investigations more than a month after the incident and
concluded them only seven months later. After more than 1500 inter-
views with officers and civilians who had been present at the convention,
"investigators were able to identify only two suspects because of officers'
refusals to talk about the incidents." The Inspector General's report also
revealed that certain commanding officers refused to order their subordi-
nates to be photographed so that victims would not be able to identify
their assailants....
As the investigation progressed, scandal heaped upon scandal. H.
Lawrence Garrett III, the Secretary of the Navy and the head of the
Tailhook investigation, asked the Pentagon to take over the investiga-
tion when reports surfaced that he was present at the festivities and
that fifty-five pages of documents that revealed his presence were de-
leted from the original reports. . . . Using lie detectors, undercover
agents, and detailed computer analyses to dismantle the "wall of silence"
that hampered earlier investigations, the Inspector General found that
even more women than suspected had been assaulted and identified 175
naval officers for possible disciplinary action.
Murray, supra note 20, at 282-83. Of all these suspects, none were convicted by
court-martial, and only fifty were disciplined at all, by fines, reprimands, and the
like. Id. at 283-84.
In the Aberdeen Proving Ground case, female trainees accused drill sergeants
of sexual harassment. The investigation into the allegations uncovered out-of-
control sexual misconduct. "A parade of former trainees, all women ... testified
that drill sergeants and trainees alike routinely initiated consensual sexual rela-
tions, a violation of military law." Elaine Sciolino, Rape Witnesses Tell of Base
Out of Control, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1997, at A8. These witnesses testified about
the freewheeling, libidinous atmosphere in which sexual activity between superi-
ors and subordinates was rampant and drill sergeants competed to have sex with
as many trainees as they could. Id. at A12. How, then, could the disruption
caused by federal court litigation of a sexual harassment complaint be any more
disruptive to the "military regime?"
2004]
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not stopped servicemembers' suits; rather, Freres and its progeny
have made it next to impossible for servicemembers to win. Ser-
vicemembers have still brought uncounted cases against their superi-
ors and the military. 0 8 Feres and its progeny also do not factor in the
costs of not affording servicemembers a remedy for sexual harassment
and other forms of discrimination.' 0 9 Further, everyone other than
servicemembers may sue the military for negligence and constitu-
tional torts, regardless of any alleged harm to the military from such
litigation.110 Many of those suits involve federal civilian employees of
the armed forces suing for sexual harassment."1 Nonetheless, Con-
gress would have to legislatively overturn Feres for servicemembers to
be able to maintain sexual harassment actions in the courts.
108. See Rhodes, supra note 102. Rhodes states:
[T]here is no evidence that negligence actions by service members over
the past twenty-five years has degraded the military mission.
The modern soldier has also been litigious in other areas. Although
this litigation has not been particularly productive for the plaintiffs, ser-
vice members have vigorously asserted their positions in direct court ac-
tion against high ranking officials. The proliferation of this
constitutional litigation apparently has not interfered substantially with
military operations.
Id. at 42.
109. Uncorrected sexual harassment and other forms of discrimination can certainly
harm morale, unit cohesion, and even the ability to fight. Discrimination against
black soldiers in Vietnam resulted in racial violence and impaired combat effi-
ciency. D. CORTWRIGHT, SOLDIERS IN REVOLT 41 (1975) (recounting black soldiers'
refusal to go into the field); Howard J. De Nike, The New "Problem Soldier"-
Dissenter in the Ranks, 49 IND. L.J. 685, 687-89 (1974) (asserting that racial vio-
lence was prompted by underlying resentment by blacks of unequal treatment);
see also id. at 56, 140, 154-55, 210, 218-19 (recounting disobedience of orders and
threats to readiness inherent in response to discrimination).
110. See Tomes, supra note 102, at 111.
111. E.g., Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that the district
court improperly invaded the province of the jury in granting summary judgment
for the Navy in a sexual harassment action by a former employee); Brown v.
Perry, 184 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 1999) (affirming that the Department of Defense
was not vicariously liable for a supervisor's harassment because of a functioning
antiharassment policy and prompt and effective action taken against harassing
behavior); Yamaguchi v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475 (9th
Cir. 1997) (holding that an employee was entitled to a jury trial and compensa-
tory damages for harassment occurring after the effective date of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991); Bailey v. West, 941 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Kan. 1996) (finding that an
Army employee made sufficient allegations to support quid pro quo sexual har-
assment claim); Skinner v. Caldera, 1999 WL 1001468 (E.E.O.C.) (finding that,
because the agency (Army) is liable because it knew of the sexual harassment
and did not take prompt remedial action, recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions
respecting the liability of an agency when a supervisor commits such harassment
do not apply).
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In addition to the overall Feres bar, the FTCA itself bars cases to
redress intentional torts.112 This bar applies whether the suit is
based on assault or is based on negligence that resulted in an inten-
tional tort.113 Thus, Congress would have to amend this section to
permit sexual harassment claims involving intentional torts to permit
victims of such harassment to obtain relief under the FTCA.
Another barrier to a lawsuit against the military, assuming that
Congress overturned Feres, is the so-called Mindes doctrine. Some cir-
cuits follow the Mindes v. Seaman 114 test to determine whether a mili-
tary claim is justiciable. First, as a threshold matter, Mindes held
that judicial review of military activities is permissible when two con-
ditions are met: (1) a servicemember alleged either that he or she had
been deprived of a constitutional right or that the service in question
had violated its own regulations; and (2) the servicemember had ex-
hausted all available administrative intraservice remedies."15 After
the servicemember has met that test, Mindes specifies four factors for
a court to review: (1) "the nature and strength of the plaintiffs chal-
lenge to the military determination"; (2) "the potential injury to the
plaintiff if review is refused"; (3) "the type and degree of anticipated
interference with the military function"; and (4) "the extent to which
the exercise of military expertise or discretion is involved."116 Even
though the Mindes court intended these tests to determine whether a
court will review a case or abstain therefrom, two of the criteria
clearly go to the merits of a case. Thus, the court must evaluate the
merits of a case before deciding whether to hear it, but it may not have
enough information early in the case in order to do so properly.1 7 Not
all circuits follow Mindes, however, and may substitute another test to
determine whether a military case is justiciable."1s
112. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2000). Perkins v. United States, 55 F.3d 910 (4th Cir. 1995).
The 1974 amendment to the FTCA, however, added some intentional torts com-
mitted by law enforcement officers, such as assault, battery, false imprisonment,
and the like, to the torts for which a plaintiff could recover. Act of Mar. 16, 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)
(2000)).
113. See supra note 112.
114. 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971), appeal after remand, 501 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1974).
115. Id. at 201.
116. Id.
117. Mary C. Griffin, Note, Making the Army Safe for Diversity: A Title VII Remedy for
Discrimination in the Military, 96 YALE L.J. 2082, 2103 (1987).
118. The Seventh Circuit, for example, however, appears to follow Mindes. In Knutson
v. Wisconsin Air National Guard, 995 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1993), a dismissed Wis-
consin Air National Guard officer brought a civil rights action against the Na-
tional Guard. In declining to follow Mindes, the Seventh Circuit noted:
As the Third Circuit has pointed out, the Mindes approach erroneously
"intertwines the concept ofjusticiability with the standards to be applied
to the merits of the case."... Rather than embracing the Mindes balanc-
ing test, we prefer a different approach. Our inquiry does not involve a
2004]
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Hill v. Berkman119 illustrates the problem with the Mindes doc-
trine and its variations with regard to Title V11120 actions against the
military. Plaintiff Hill challenged the Army's use of the combat exclu-
sion policy contending that it was a pretext for discrimination against
women. The court declined to follow cases holding that Title VII did
not apply to the uniformed military,12x but rather, applied a balancing
test similar to the Mindes test to determine whether to review a Title
VII claim against the military. To avoid second-guessing common de-
cisions that are crucial to disciplinary relationships, courts should not
afford a Title VII remedy for "isolated individual allegations of dis-
crimination," which are better left to intramilitary remedies.122 Even
those cases involving policies that are applicable to a large number of
servicemembers should not be reviewed, unless "the military decision
was clearly arbitrary and erroneous, with a harmful effect present at
the time the dispute reaches the court."123
Thus, the Hill court used a variant of the Mindes test to vitiate
Title VII. Although Title VII does not permit either individual in-
stances of discrimination or discriminatory policies, 124 the Hill test
permits hearing military cases involving only the latter. Further, al-
though Title VII does not permit a good faith defense,' 25 the Hill deci-
sion implicitly permits such a defense by adopting the clearly
arbitrary standard.
Even assuming that a military victim of sexual harassment could
bring a lawsuit for damages, she would find another bar to recovery-
the law that protects victims of civil rights violations. Title VI1126 is
"the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal
employment."'12 7 Although one might think that uniformed military
members were federal employees, at least for protection from discrimi-
nation, the overwhelming weight of authority holds that Title VII does
balancing of individual and military interests on each side, but rather a
determination of whether the military seeks to achieve legitimate ends
by means designed to accommodate the individual right at stake to an
appropriate degree.
Knutson, 995 F.2d at 768 (citations omitted).
119. 635 F. Supp. 1228 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
121. Hill, 635 F. Supp. 1228.
122. Id. at 1241.
123. Id. The court believed that such a highly deferential test would allow the mili-
tary the necessary flexibility to make and alter policies, id., but it did not explain
why military policies with a discriminatory impact should be afforded more defer-
ence than other organizations' policies. Griffin, supra note 117, at 2094.
124. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (individual discrimi-
natory actions); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (discriminatory
institutional policy).
125. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
127. Brown v. Gen. Services Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976).
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not extend to uniformed military personnel. 128 Thus, not only must
Congress legislatively overrule Feres to permit sexual harassment
suits against the military, but it also must ensure that courts do not
use Feres or a variant thereon as a court-made bar to such lawsuits
and make it clear that uniformed military members are protected by
Title VII.
The recent case of Shiver v. United States129 illustrates the effect
of these bars to sexual harassment lawsuits. The plaintiff was a
trainee who was raped by her drill sergeant at Aberdeen Proving
Grounds. 130 She sued under the FTCA. The U.S. District Court for
the District of Maryland found against her on all three grounds: Feres
barred her claim; the intentional tort exception of the FTCA barred
her claims; and federal rights laws prohibiting sexual harassment of
federal employees do not give rise to civil liability in favor of active
duty military personnel.131 Because the court found no jurisdiction, it
did not have to decide whether Mindes made the case nonjusticiable.
128. E.g., Gonzalez v. Dep't of Army, 718 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1983); Johnson v. Alexan-
der, 572 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1978). The only case to find sexual discrimination in
the military to be actionable under Title VII is Hill, 635 F. Supp. 1228 (holding
that Title VII could apply in limited circumstances involving facially discrimina-
tory policies). Hill, however, was not a sexual harassment case and would extend
jurisdiction only to outrageous incidents of discrimination, because investigations
into less serious military decisionmaking would be too intrusive. Id. at 1241.
129. 34 F. Supp. 2d 321 (D. Md. 1999).
130. See supra note 107 for a general discussion of the harassment at Aberdeen Prov-
ing Ground.
131. Shiver, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23. The court could hardly have been more
promilitary:
The military services of this country cannot effectively be managed or
deployed if subject to litigative hindsight by federal judges ... and, con-
trary to plaintiffs assertion, military discipline would be adversely af-
fected by allowing tort litigation under the FTCA, as officers' and non-
commissioned officers' authority and credibility would both be open to
attack outside military channels, thus undermining their authority. The
resulting fear of litigation would paralyze decision-making in the one
segment of our society that remains free of such paralysis, and that must
remain free of it, if it is to fulfill its mission. The point needs no more
discussion than that.
Id. at 322.
One doubts whether the command at Aberdeen, particularly the noncommis-
sioned officers that committed rape and other sexual harassment, had much au-
thority left to undermine. And their decisionmaking appears to have been so
aberrant that it needed fear of something, such as litigation. Justice Brennan's
dissent in United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987), which held that Feres
barred the claim of a soldier who was the victim of the unknowing administration
of LSD during military testing, seems equally applicable to sexual harassment
amounting to rape:
The Court holds that the Constitution provides [the plaintiff] with no
remedy, solely because his injuries were inflicted while he performed his
duties in the Nation's Armed Forces. If our Constitution required this
result, the Court's decision, though legally necessary, would expose a
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One commentator has noted that promulgating an executive order
prohibiting sexual harassment in the military and setting up a system
using administrative law judges or inspectors general to investigate
and adjudicate claims is unlikely to be effective, because the next
president could invalidate the order and the inspector general has
demonstrated its inability to handle sexual harassment claims.
132
Thus, Congress should include uniformed service personnel in Title
VII. For this proposal to work, Congress must also make the military
subject to the jurisdiction of the EEOC. 133
This commentator's proposal is for the Title VII protection for ser-
vicemembers to retain some of the military's existing grievance proce-
dures while guaranteeing an impartial review of their complaints in
federal civilian courts.134 Such a procedure would have a number of
benefits. First, filing the complaint simultaneously with the com-
mander and the EEOC counselor as opposed to going straight to the
EEOC while bypassing the command would preserve the commander's
authority and permit early correction efforts. The EEOC's initial as-
sessment should, however, result in preventing or minimizing
coverups by commanders who do not want their superiors to think
that they have a sexual harassment problem in their unit 135 while
protecting the military from frivolous lawsuits. 13 6 Second, once the
victim has exhausted administrative remedies, a jury could decide
sexual harassment cases under a preponderance of the evidence
standard.13 7
tragic flaw in that document. But in reality, the Court disregards the
commands of our Constitution, and bows instead to the purported re-
quirements of a different master, military discipline, declining to provide
Stanley with a remedy because it finds "special factors counseling hesi-
tation." This is abdication, not hesitation.
Id. at 686 (citation omitted).
For another horror story in which a federal court found that Feres barred re-
lief, see Stubbs v. United States, 744 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that a law-
suit by an enlisted woman who committed suicide as a result of sexual
harassment would disrupt discipline).
132. Murray, supra note 20, at 298.
133. See Gonzalez, 718 F.2d at 928.
134. Murray, supra note 20, at 299. Murray suggests that a servicemember would
first have to bring simultaneous complaints to her commanding officer and an
Equal Employment Opportunity counselor. They would review the matter with
the servicemember and try to resolve the matter informally. An unsatisfied com-
plainant would then be able to file a formal complaint with the EEO officer, who
would investigate the claim. If the EEO resolution is unsatisfactory, the ser-
vicemember could have an EEOC hearing and bring a civil action. The extension
of Title VII would permit reinstatement, back pay, or other relief. Id. at 299-300.
135. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
136. Griffin, supra note 117, at 2106.
137. Professor Chamallas terms the ability of a civilian jury to decide such claims
under a preponderance of the evidence standard a "valuable opportunity" and
notes that civil suits have the advantage of permitting victims to be vindicated
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What about the potential harm, if any, inherent in permitting ser-
vicemembers to maintain Title VII actions against the military? Com-
mentators have asserted the following potential harms: disruption of
military discipline, inability of the civilian courts to evaluate military
decisionmaking,138 disruption to the military by civilian investigators,
and a perception that military personnel lack faith in their superiors if
they seek recoveries from fellow servicemembers and superiors.139 Al-
though certain of these concerns have some superficial validity, none
of them, nor the aggregate of them, justifies the ban on sexual harass-
ment lawsuits of Feres and other judicial decisions on the grounds dis-
cussed above.14o
As to the disruption to discipline, the Feres doctrine, as discussed
above, has not eliminated lawsuits, only recoveries. 14 1 Thus, ser-
vicemembers continue to sue the military and their commanders:
[T]here is no evidence that negligence actions by service members over the
past twenty-five years have degraded the military mission.
The modern soldier has also been litigious in other areas. Although this
litigation has not been particularly productive for the plaintiffs, service mem-
bers have vigorously asserted their positions in direct court actions against
high ranking officials. This proliferation of this constitutional litigation ap-
parently has not interfered substantially with military operations. 142
The Air Force's highest ranking female fighter pilot, Lieutenant
Colonel Martha E. McSally, sued Secretary of Defense Donald Rums-
feld. She claimed that the military's policy requiring all female mili-
tary personnel at Prince Sultan Air Force Base in Saudi Arabia when
off base, even on official business, to wear the customary head-to-toe
abaya and matching headscarf, not to drive, to ride in the back seat of
vehicles, and to be escorted by males at all times was unconstitutional
in that the policy discriminated against women and violated their re-
ligious freedom by forcing them to adopt the garb of another faith.
Although she was not alleging sexual harassment, her suit illustrates
several of the problems that victims of sexual harassment face in
bringing suit against their superiors: she was not seeking monetary
damages because of Feres and its progeny; she went through channels
for seven years to try to get the policy changed; and she finally had to
resort to a civilian lawsuit. A couple of years ago, it seemed that she
would be damned with faint praise on her performance evaluations,
after having been promoted four years before her peers, and that she
without sending offenders to jail, a compromise of great utility. Chamallas, supra
note 12 at 363.
138. See Robin Rogers, Comment, A Proposal for Combating Sexual Discrimination in
the Military: Amendment of Title VII, 78 CAL. L. REV. 165, 193-94 (1990).
139. Kay, supra note 25, at 340.
140. See supra notes 107-112 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 107-112 and accompanying text.
142. Rhodes, supra note 102, at 42.
20041
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
would likely face the slow, painful fizzle of her previously stellar mili-
tary career.143 It seemed that the warrior mystique would be at work
here and that, even if she were by some miracle able to win the law-
suit, get the policy changed, get promoted on time to full colonel, and
get a plum assignment, she would never enjoy the same level of trust
and confidence of her fellow pilots and officers and her superiors that
she had enjoyed before she went outside the chain of command and
made her complaint public. But the military may be changing be-
cause, in the meantime, the Senate and the House unanimously
passed a law prohibiting the policy. The military responded by chang-
ing the word "require" in the policy with "strongly encourage," so she
continued her suit. Using the civilian court system apparently worked
for her, because Lieutenant Colonel McSally recently received a plum
assignment for any pilot, and a first for an active duty woman: the
first female fighter squadron commander, commanding the 354th
Fighter Squadron at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona.1
4 4
Feres and its progeny do not prevent lawsuits by servicemembers
seeking relief other than monetary damages or suits by civilians
against the military, including civilian employees of the military de-
partments suing for employment discrimination, including sexual har-
assment.14 5 As Justice Brennan noted:
The Court fears that military affairs might be disrupted by factual inquiries
necessitated by Bivens actions. The judiciary is already involved, however, in
cases that implicate military judgment and decisions, as when a soldier sues
for nonservice-connected injury, when a soldier sues civilian contractors with
the Government for service-connected injury, and when a civilian is injured
and sues a civilian contractor with the military or a military tortfeasor.
1 4 6
Further, how could a sexual harassment lawsuit be any more dis-
ruptive than the Tailhook investigation and disciplinary action, the
Aberdeen Proving Ground's courts-martial, or Sergeant Major McKin-
ney's trial? For example, the Naval Investigative Service's investiga-
tion into Tailhook comprised 1,500 interviews with Navy and Marine
aviators, and the incident certainly caused other harm to good order
and discipline:
The failure to deal adequately with Tailhook has had an enormous effect on
the Navy. In the wake of Tailhook, the Secretary of the Navy resigned. The
Senate Armed Services Committee halted all officer promotions in the Navy.
143. Ann Gerhart, The Air Force Flier in the Ointment: Martha McSally's Garb in
Saudi Arabia Chafed, So She Pressed a Lawsuit, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2002, at
C1-C2.
144. Carol Ann Alaimo, Woman to Head Air Force Fighter Squad Unit, ARIZONA DAILY
STAR, May 1, 2004; Felix J. Freyer, There Is No Map-At RIC, McSally Advises:
Be Prepared to Sacrifice, PROVIDENCE JouRNAL, May 18, 2003, at E.01.
145. See supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
146. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 703 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Many valuable officers have lost their jobs; many more will probably follow.
Morale is at a dangerous low.
1 4 7
In short, no evidence exists that Title VII or any other lawsuits by
servicemembers against their superiors or the military itself seeking
damages actually harm discipline, and assuming arguendo that such
harm exists, it is no more harm than exists in cases in which military
members sue for other redress, such as injunctive relief, or that harm
which exists when civilian employees sue the military. Further, no
evidence exists that such a civilian lawsuit is any more disruptive
than a highly politicized sexual harassment court-martial. Finally,
again assuming some harm from such suits, it pales in comparison to
the disruption caused by the continuing harassment experienced in
the military service. As General Douglas MacArthur noted, ser-
vicemembers' morale "will quickly wither and die if soldiers come to
believe themselves the victims of indifference or injustice on the part
of their government, or of ignorance, personal ambition, or ineptitude
on the part of their military leaders."148 More recently, General Fred-
erick M. Franks, who commanded the U.S. and British forces of VII
Corps during Desert Storm in the main ground attack that liberated
Kuwait, discussed necessary character traits for leaders:
Soldiers need to know that we will be there for them when they need us dur-
ing the battle and later.
Integrity is one of those principles continually put to the test....
Integrity in command is the province of the commander. And there are litmus
tests. Do we mean what we say? Does say equal do? Do we accept responsi-
bility for our actions no matter the consequences, or in these days, the media
pressure, or the instant historical reputation? Where are our loyalties? Do we
return loyalty to our subordinates? . .. Do we share hardships with our
troops? Do they see us and hear from us when the going really gets tough? Do
we square up to the really tough calls? Do we shine the spotlight of inquiry
into any area that is called for no matter the consequences?1 4 9
He concludes that if leaders believe in their subordinates and "estab-
lish trust, mutual respect, and loyalty, there is no limit to what the
organization can accomplish." 15 0
To the extent that such an action would adversely affect ongoing
military operations, the proposed modification by Congress permitting
such lawsuits could have a section similar to the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act,151 which permits the court to stay civil proceedings at
147. Kay, supra note 25, at 310.
148. Griffin, supra note 117, at 2109 (quoting BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 771
(15th ed. 1982), quoting ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY, FOR
THE FIscAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1933).
149. General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., The Fourth Annual Hugh J. Clausen Leader-
ship Lecture: Soldiering Today and Tomorrow, 158 MIL. L. REV. 130, 134-35
(1998) (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 136.
151. 50 U.S.C. §§ 501-593 (2000).
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any stage thereof in which a servicemember is a plaintiff or defendant
during his military service, unless it finds that the servicemember's
ability to prosecute or. defend the suit is not materially affected by rea-
son of his or her military service. 15 2 If the military's ability to defend
itself in a Title VII action was materially affected, for instance, by a
deployment of the unit involved so that government witnesses were
unavailable, a similar provision could provide for a stay in such
circumstances.
The argument that permitting Title VII suits would involve the ju-
diciary in military matters that it does not have the competence to
evaluate does not hold water either. First, sexual harassment cases
hardly involve whether to use Navy Seals, Army Green Berets, or
Marine Force Recon for a particular mission or which servicemembers
should be promoted to the next higher grade based on their military
records. Rather, they involve such questions as whether a particular
situation qualifies as a hostile work environment or whether a partic-
ular assault or other action rises to the level of sexual harass-
ment153 -something that federal courts do regularly. Even if such a
case had the additional element of the court having to evaluate the
effect of the hierarchical rank structure of the military on the conduct,
both sides could educate federal judges and juries on that matter as
experts do on other complicated subjects in many complicated cases,
such as civil and criminal Medicare fraud cases brought under the an-
tikickback statute,15 4 antitrust actions, patent infringement cases,
152. Id. § 521.
153. The relevant regulation, 29 C.F.R. 1604.11(a) (2003), states:
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature when (1) submission to such con-
duct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an indi-
vidual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as a basis for employment decisions affecting such in-
dividual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimi-
dating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
154. The federal health care antikickback statute prohibits transactions intended to
induce patient referrals or to compensate one for making such referrals. 42
U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b (2003) (criminal penalties for acts involving Federal health
care programs). These extremely complicated cases may involve billing experts
to testify as to whether a payment is bona fide or a kickback, accounting experts
to testify whether an equipment lease is for fair market value, see generally,
Pamela H. Bucy, The Poor Fit of Traditional Evidentiary Doctrine and Sophisti-
cated Crime: An Empirical Analysis of Health Care Fraud Prosecutions, 63 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 383, 398-411 (1994), or comprises an illegal kickback, legal experts
to explain the nuances of the statute because, as a specific intent crime, the de-
fendant's belief that the transaction was legal under the complicated statutory
and regulatory scheme is a defense. See Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d
1390 (9th Cir. 1995).
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and others in which the triers of fact know little about the technical
aspects of the matter.
Would civilian investigators be disruptive? Possibly, but again, no
more so than the military investigators in such cases as Tailhook.
First, military investigators often wear civilian clothes. The Army's
Criminal Investigation Division, the Naval Investigative Service, and
the Air Force Office of Special Investigations typically wear civilian
clothes when conducting investigations.155 Second, any investigator
is disruptive in a sense, military or civilian. But again, so is sexual
harassment.156 It is hard to imagine anything more disruptive than
such situations as Tailhook or the Aberdeen Proving Ground cases,
whether they ultimately end up with an EEOC investigation on top of
the criminal one or not.
The argument that permitting such lawsuits would cause military
members to lose faith with their superiors seems to be the most spe-
cious of all. Such an argument presumes that servicemembers do not
know when their superiors commit wrongs, such as sexual harass-
ment, do not know when their superiors fail to investigate such
wrongs, do not know when their superiors cover up such wrongs, 157
and do not know or care that victims of such wrongs fail to receive
compensation. Such an argument may also presume that those ser-
vicemembers who do know of such wrongs do not care or that they
condone sexual harassment. Although a few servicemembers, such as
the Tailhook aviators, may not care, nothing could be further from the
truth in regard to servicemembers in general. Servicemembers do
know of such wrongs, and they do care. Experiencing or learning of
such wrongs and their superiors' failures to correct those wrongs
clearly harms morale.158 Servicemembers take an oath to support
155. See United States v. Swift, 17 C.M.A. 227 (1967) (involving an Air Force Office of
Special Investigations agent who participated in an investigation by German po-
lice, which did not make rights warnings necessary where the agent was solely an
observer, was dressed in civilian clothes, and was not introduced as a police
officer).
156. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
157. General Franks, supra note 149, states that in this information age, ser-
vicemembers are informed. "They notice. They pay attention to not only what
they are doing but what is going on around them. They communicate with fellow
soldiers about the mission, training, and the organization." Id. at 142-43.
158. From the earliest times, military experts have stressed the need to treat ser-
vicemembers well. Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese general, opined that a primary
responsibility of a general is to treat soldiers with warmth and beneficence. SUN
Tzu, THE ART OF WAR 64 (Samuel B. Griffith trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1963).
The strict military disciplinarian Baron von Steuben observed that a com-
mander's first objective should be to "gain the love of his men, by treating them
with every possible kindness and humanity, inquiring into their complaints, and
when well founded, seeing them redressed," BARON VON STUBEN, I REGULATIONS
FOR THE ORDER AND DISCIPLINE OF THE TROOPS OF THE UNITED STATES 135 (1785),
quoted in ROBERT S. RIVKIN, G.I. RIGHTS AND ARMY JUSTICE 335 (1970). Subse-
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and defend the Constitution, not to support and defend their com-
manders. 1 59 The Constitution would seem to require equal protection
of the laws for victims of sexual harassment in the military as in the
civilian sector. Any alleged harms to the military inherent in such
lawsuits are not supported, and, to the extend that they exist, they are
certainly outweighed by the disruption of the amount and nature of
the sexual harassment that is occurring in today's military and by the
failure to provide adequate remedies to redress those wrongs.
V. CONCLUSION
Although one of the coauthors of this Article and another one of his
frequent coauthors have proposed the abolition of the military courts-
martial system in times of peace 16o and the repeal of the so-called
Feres doctrine, which prohibits servicemembers from suing their mili-
tary commanders for monetary damages,161 perhaps stronger reasons
exist to replace trials by courts-martial with civil rights lawsuits for
sexual harassment offenses committed by servicemembers. To date,
the military and in particular the military justice system have been
ineffective in eliminating or at least reducing sexual harassment in
the military. The military further lacks any effective mechanism for
protecting the victims of sexual harassment and compensating them
for the harms that they suffer. Whether or not the courts are correct
that Title VII does not apply to the uniformed military, Congress
should permit Title VII sexual harassment actions by ser-
vicemembers. Further, Congress should legislatively overrule Feres
quent military leadership theory confirms von Steuben. World War I studies
demonstrated that resistance to military authority springs from, among others,
degrading use of military authority. See LAWRENCE B. RADINE, THE TAMING OF
THE TRooPs: SOCIAL CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY 9-10, 34-38, 78-79,
115-16 (1977). What could be more degrading than a military superior sexually
harassing a subordinate and then not permitting the victim the same recourse
that civilians enjoy? General McCaffery, past commander of the U.S. Southern
Command, speaking of preventing war crimes against noncombatants, noted that
"[i]fwe treat our own soldiers with dignity under the rule of law, with some sense
of compassion, then our soldiers are much more likely to act in a similar fashion
toward the civil population." General Barry R. McCaffrey, Role of the Armed
Forces in the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, 149 MIL. L. REV. 229,
237 (1995).
159. All servicemembers take the following oath:
I, __ , do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I
will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders
of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice. So help me God.
10 U.S.C. § 502 (2000) (emphasis added).
160. See Spak & Tomes, supra note 52.
161. See Tomes, supra note 102.
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and its progeny to permit sexual harassment lawsuits by military
members. Even though the doctrinal underpinings of Feres and its
progeny are wrong at worst or have no evidence backing them up at
best, servicemembers cannot depend on the courts to protect their
rights as would seem to be the federal courts' function. 16 2 Even as-
suming the existence of some adverse effect on the military inherent
in permitting Title VII actions for sexual harassment, that harm can-
not possibly be worse than the harm from continuing serious incidents
of sexual harassment. Courts-martial have not eradicated it. Zero tol-
erance policies have not eradicated it. Public condemnation has not
eradicated it. Large damage awards might be the solution. Even if
Title VII actions do not deter sexual harassment, at least its military
victims will be compensated and "women constituting our Armed
Forces [will be] treated as honored members of society whose rights do
not turn on the charity of a military commander."16 3
162. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Chief Justice Marshall
stated, "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of
the first duties of government is to afford that protection." Id. at 163 (emphasis
added). See also Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 247 (1967) (outlining that the
Constitution intended the courts to be the branch of government primarily re-
sponsible for enforcing the Bill of Rights).
163. Winters v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 57, 60 (1968) (Douglas, Circuit Justice). The
entire quote reads:
[I]t is the function of the courts to make sure ... that the men and wo-
men constituting our Armed Forces are treated as honored members of
society whose rights do not turn on the charity of a military com-
mander .... A member of the Armed Forces is entitled to equal justice
under law not as conceived by the generosity of a commander but as
written in the Constitution and engrossed by Congress in our Public
Laws.
Id. at 59-60.
